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) 
[So F. No. 19346. In Bank. Feb. 24, 1956.J 
VICTOR BADILLO, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT 
OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, 
Respondent. 
[1] Prohibition-Application of Bules - Crimin.aJ Proceedings-
AccusatolT Pleading.-.A defendant is held to answer without 
reasonable or probable cause if his commitment is based en-
tirely on incompetent evidence, and in such a case the trial 
court should grant a motion to set aside the information (Pen. 
Code, § 995), and if it does not do so a peremptory writ of 
prohibition will issue to prohibit further p~oceedings. 
[2] Indictment and Information-Motion to Set Aside--Grounds-
Evidence megally Obtained.-Where evidence before the 
magistrate bearing on the issue of illegality of a search or 
seizure is in conilict or susceptible of eon1licting' inferences 
[1] See Oal.Jur., Prohibition, § 21 j Am.Jur., Prohibition, § 22. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Prohil)ition, § 44; [2, 4] Indictment 
and Information, § 88(6); [3,5,6] Searches and Seizures, § 1; [7] 
Criminal Law, § 410. . 
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or consists only of the testimony of prosecuting witnesses, the 
trial court in ruling on a motion to set aside the information 
will frequently not be in a position to make a final determina-
tion as to the admissibility of the evidence, and accordingly 
the information should not be set aside on the ground that 
the essential evidence was illegally obtained if there is any 
substantial evidence or applicable presumption to support a 
contrary conclusion, since in such cases the ultimate decision 
on admissibility can be made at the trial on the basis of all 
evidence bearing on the issue. 
[3] Searches and Seizures-Presumptions.-In the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary, it is presumed that officers actf(d legally 
in making a search or seizure. 
[4] Indictment and Information-Motion to Set Aside-Grounds 
-Evidence megally Obtained.-If the issue of legality of a 
search or seizure is raised for the first time on a motion to 
set aside the information, the motion should be denied unless 
the evidence before the committing magistrate establishes that 
efSsential evidence was illegally obtained. 
[5] Searches and Seizures-Burden of Proof.-When the question 
of the legality of an arrest or of a search or seizure is raised 
either at the preliminary hearing or at the trial, defendant 
makes a prima facie case when he establishes that an arrest 
was made without a warrant or that private premises were 
entered on a search made without a warrant, and the burden 
then rests on the prosecution to show justification. 
[6] ld.-Burden of Proof.-Where defendant makes a prima facie 
showing of illegal entry by establishing that officers broke 
into a house without a search warrant, the burden rests on the 
prosecution to introduce evidence that the officers had reason-
able cause to break and enter to make an arrest (See Pen. 
Code § 844), and in the absence of such evidence it must be 
taken as established for the purposes of a proceeding in pro-
hibition to restrain further proceedings under an information 
that the entry into the house was unlawful, it being immaterial 
whether or not it was defendant's house. 
[7] Criminal Law - Evidence - Evidence Obtained by Unlawful 
Seizure.-Where defendant's flight out the front door of a 
house and attempted disposal of a package of heroin towards 
a federal narcotics agent was the direct result of an officer's 
illegal entry, such evidence was obtained in violation of con-
stitutional guarantees. 
i3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq. 
[7] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 127; Am.Jur., Evidenoe, § 393 
et seq. 
) 
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PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of the City and County of San Francisco from pro· 
ceeding further in prosecution of a criminal case. Writ 
granted. 
MacInnis, Alaga & Glassman and Harry P. Glassman for 
. Petitioner. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Arlo E. Smith, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-By information petitioner was charged 
with possessing heroin in violation of Health and Safety 
Code, section 11500. His motion to set aside the information 
on the ground that the evidence against him was obtained 
by an illegal search and seizure was denied, and he now seeks 
a writ of prohibition to prevent his trial. 
Evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing of the 
following facts: At approximately 6 p. m. on January 6, 
1955, federal narcotics Agents Hipkins and Casey and Offi· 
cers Getchell and McKinley of the San Francisco Police 
Department went to a house on Sycamore Street in San Fran. 
cisco. Agent Hipkins remained in front of the house, and the 
three other officers went to the rear. Officer Getchell knoeked 
at the back door, which was locked, and received no response. 
He then forced the door open and entered the house followed 
by Agent Casey. Shortly thereafter, petitioner, followed 
closely by Officer Getchell, ran out the front door and threw 
a package of heroin toward Agent Hipkins, who recovered 
it. None of the officers had a search warrant. 
[1] In Rogers v. Superior Court, ante, p. 3 [291 P.2d 
929], we held that a "defendant has been held to answer 
without reasonable or probable cause if his commitment is 
based entirely on incompetent evidence," (ante, at p. 7) 
and accordingly, in such a case the trial court shonId 
grant a motion to set aside the information (Pen. Code, 
§ 995), and if it does not do so, a peremptory writ of prohibi. 
tion will issue to prohibit further proceedings. (Pen. Code, 
§ 999a.) No problem is presented in applying this rule in 
cases involving searches and eeizures in which the facts bear· 
ing on the legality of the seareh or seizure are undisputed 
and establish as a matter of law that the evidence is or is 
not admissible. [2] In many cases, however, the evidence 
.. , 
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before the magistrate bearing on this issue may be in conflict 
or susceptible of conflicting inferences or consist only of 
the testimony of prosecution witnesses, and under these cir-
cumstances the court in ruling on a motion to set aside the 
information will frequently not be in a position to make a 
final determination as to the admissibility of the evidence. 
Accordingly, the information should not be set aside on the 
ground that essential evidence was illegally obtained if there 
is any substantial evidence or applicable presumption to 
support a contrary conclusion (see People v. Michael, 45 
Ca1.2d 751, 753-754 [290 P.2d 852]; People v. Mariin, 45 
Ca1.2d 755, 761-762 [290 P.2d 855)), and in such cases the 
ultimate decision on admissibility can be made at the trial 
on the basis of all of the evidence bearing on the issue. (See 
People v. Gorg, 45 Ca1.2d 776, 780-781 [291 P.2d 469) ; People 
v. Berger, 44 Ca1.2d 459, 464 [282 P.2d 509].) [3,4] In the 
9.bsence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the 
~fficers acted legally (see People v. Farrara, ante, p. 265 
[294 P.2d 21)), and if the issue is raised for the first time 
on a motion to set aside the information, the motion should 
be denied unless the evidence before the committing magis-
trate establishes that essential evidence was illegally obtained. 
[5] When, however, the question of the legality of an arrest 
or of a search and seizure is raised either at the preliminary 
hearing or at the trial, the defendant makes a prima facie 
case when he establishes that an arrest was made without a 
warrant or that private premises were entered or a search 
made without a search warrant, and the burden then rests 
on the prosecution to show proper justification. (Dragna v. 
White, 45 Ca1.2d 469, 471-472 [289 P.2d 428] ; Coverstone v. 
Davies, 38 Ca1.2d 315, 319 [239 P.2d 876) ; Hughes v. Ore"b, 
36 Ca1.2d 854, 858 [228 P.2d 550); People v. Boyles, 45 
Ca1.2d 652, 656 [290 P.2d 535) ; People v. Gorg, S'Upra, 45 Cal. 
2d 776,782-783.) 
[6] In the present case defendant made a prima faciE:' 
showing of illegal entry by establishing that the officers broke 
into the house without a search warrant, and the burden 
then rested on the prosecution to introduce evidence that 
the officers had reasonable cause to break and enter to make 
an arrest. (See Pen. Code, § 844.) Since no such evidence 
was presented, it must be taken a<l established for the purposes 
of this proceeding that the entry into the house was unlawful,· 
• Although the preliminary heariDg in this ease was held before the 
decision in People v. Ca1Ian, .. Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.lld 1105], defendant 
) 
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and it is immaterial whether or not it was defendant'8 house. 
(People v. Martin, supra, 45 Ca1.2d 755, 760-761.) 
[7] The attorney general contends that defendant aban-
doned the evidence when he threw it toward Agent Hipkins 
and that therefore he may not object to its use against him. 
It elearly appears, however, that defendant's 1iight out the 
front door and attempted disposal of the evidence was the 
direct result of Officer Getchell's illegal entry, and accord-
ingly, the evidence was obtained in violation of constitutional 
guarantees. (Silverthorne Lbr. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 
385,392 [40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319, 24 A.L.R. 1426] ; People 
v. Berger, 44 Ca1.2d 459, 462 [282 P.2d 509]; People v. 
Stewart, 232 Mich. 670 [206 N.W. 337, 338].) 
Let the peremptory writ. of prohibition issue as prayed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment and generally in 
the reasoning in the majority opinion but I wish to point out 
that under a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States (Dantan George Rca v. United States of Amer-
ica, January 16, 1956, 350 U.S. 214 [76 8. Ct. 292, 100 L. 
Ed. --]) it would seem that evidence illegally obtained by 
federal agents would not be admissible in a state court not-
withstanding the rule announced by this court in People. v. 
Cahan,44 Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905]. 
SPENCE, J.-I dissent. 
Petitioner was charged with the possession of heroin in 
violation of section 11500 of the Health and Safety Code. 
Possession of narcotics is in the nature of a eontinuing offense. 
and the evidence shows that petitioner had committed and 
was committing the offense at the time of the arrest and 
search. I am therefore. of the opinion that this ease presents 
two material questions: (1) whether the arrest without a 
antieipated a pos8ible change in the law, and the magistrate permitted 
him to establish that the entry was made without a search warrant. Pre-
sumably in reliance on the nonexclusionary rule, the prosecution made 
no attempt to prove that the officers had reasonable cauee to enter the 
l!ouse to make an arrest. Since defendant has not been in jeopardy 
(1" r, HarrOf&, 191 Cal. 457,466 [217 P. 728]; see P,opl, v. Godl'tDski, 
22 Cal.2d 677, 681-682 [140 P.2d 381]; Pen. Code, •• 999,1021), there is 
nothing to prevent the prosecution from instituting a new proceeding 
and proving, if it ean, that the offieers had reasonable cause to enter 
the premises to make an arrest. 
) 
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warrant was a lawful arrest; and (2) if so, whether the search 
was reasonable as an incident to such lawful arrest. 
Heretofore this court has deemed it unnecessary to de-
termine whether an arrest without a warrant under the 
circumstances presented here is a lawful arrest under sub-
division 2 of section 836 of the Penal Code. It was so 
declared in People v. Brown, 45 Ca1.2d 640, at page 643 
[290 P.2d 528], where it was held that "the legality of 
an arrest is not necessarily determinative of the lawfulness 
of a search incident thereto." This court further said: 
"Moreover, whether or not the arrest of a guilty defendant 
is lawful, it is clearly unreasonable if the officer has no 
'reasonable cause' to believe the defendant guilty, and a 
search incident thereto can be no more reasonable than the 
arrest itself." (P. 644.) Thus it appears that this court 
has made a distinction between a lawful arrest and a 
reasonable arrest. I had doubt concerning the validity of 
any such distinction, and it was for this reason that I voteil 
for a rehearing in People v. Brown, supra, 45 Ca1.2d 640, 
and People v. Simon, 45 Ca1.2d 645 [290 P.2d 531]. I have 
concluded that the question of the lawfulness of the arrest is a 
material one in the determination of the present case and 
of other pending eases, and that it should be decided here. 
Section 836 of the Penal Code provides: "A peace-
officer may . . . without a warrant, arrest a person: 
"1. For a public offense committed or attempted in his 
presence. 
"2. When a person arrested has committed a felony, al-
though not in his presence. 
"3. When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has 
reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have 
committed it. 
"4. On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the com-
mission of a felony by the party arrested. 
"5. At night, when there is reasonable cause to believe 
that he has committed a felony." 
In my opinion, the arrest without a warrant in the 
present case was lawful under the above-quoted subdivision 2. 
An analysis of section 836 shows that there is a marked dif-
ference between the provisions of subdivision 2 and those of 
subdivisions 3, 4, and 5. The three last-mentioned subdivisions 
specify the circumstances under which "reasonable cause" 
is required in order to make lawful an arrest without a war-
rant, but subdivision 2 makes no mention of "reasonable 
) 
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cause" and maltes lawful an arrest without a warrant "when 
a person arrested has committed a felony." 
In determining the lawfulness of an arrest, all subdivisions 
of section 836 must be considered together, and subdivision 2 
must be given its obvious meaning. If we depart from the 
clear language of that subdivision by engrafting thereon an 
additional requirement of "reasonable cause," we do violence 
to the terms of the subdivision and also render it meaning-
less and purposeless. The remaining subdivisions cover those 
lawful arrests which require "reasonable cause" and cover 
every arrest which might be made under subdivision 2 if an 
arrest under subdivision 2 is held to be conditioned upon an 
unexpressed requirement of "reasonable cause." We cannot 
assume that the Legislature intended to enact a purposeless 
provision when it included subdivision 2 in that section, but 
that conclusion is inevitable if we fail to give effect to its 
plain and unambiguous terms. I therefore conclude that an 
arrest without a warrant is a lawful arrest if the person ar-
rested has committed a felony, regardless of whether the 
arresting officer acted upon such prior knowledge as might 
be deemed to constitute "reasonable cause." Of course the 
arresting officer acts at his peril (Hughes v. Oreb, 36 Ca1.2d 
854 [228 P.2d 550] j Coyne v. Nelson, 107 Cal.App.2d 469 
[237 P.2d 45]), but there appears to be no sound reason for 
holding the arrest unlawful if the person arrested has in 
fact committed a felony. It further appears that the officer 
making such lawful arrest may do so by using such means as 
are sanctioned by section 844 of the Penal Code. (People v. 
Martin,45 Ca1.2d 755 [290 P.2d 855].) 
The question remains as to whether the search and seirore 
here made was reasonable as an incident of a lawful arrest. 
Since the adoption of the exclusionary rule, which declares 
inadmissible any evidence obtained through "unreasonable 
searches and seizures" (People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 
P.2d 905] ; People v. Berger, 44 Cal.2d 459 [282 P.2d 509] ; 
People v. Tarantino, 45 Ca1.2d 590 [290 P.2d 505]), this 
court has been considering a series of cases presenting the 
question of whether searches under varying circumstances were 
reasonable or unreasonable. In deciding these cases, this 
court has been endeavoring to establish "workable rules 
governing searches and seizures" and is committed to the 
avoidance of "needless refinements and distinctions" and 
"needless limitations on the right to conduct reasonable 
searches and seizures." (People v. Cahan, IVpra, pp. 450-
) 
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451.) The unfinished task of establishing such rules is of 
the utmost importance, not only by reason of the relation of 
such rules to the application of the exclusionary rule but also 
because of their relation to actions which may be brought 
against law enforcement officers, seeking to impose criminal 
and civil sanctions upon them for the making of searches 
which may be claimed to be unreasonable. 
The inherent difficulty of establishing logical, workable. 
and understandable rules to supplement the exclusionary rule 
has been generally recognized. It seems clear, however, that 
in establishing these rules, we should endeavor to balance 
the interests of the individual with the interests of society; 
that we should not unduly hamper the legitimate efforts of 
those who are charged with the solution of the perplexing 
problems of law enforcement j and that we should not un-
necessarily open unduly wide the avenues of escape for those 
who apparently have no regard for our laws except insofar 
as those laws may appear to provide a shield to protect them 
in their illegal operations. To this end we should not hold 
unreasonable those searches which may properly be held 
to be reasonable, and we should strive to formulate logical 
rules which will establish a consistent pattern to guide our 
law enforcement officers. 
This court has already properly determined that a lawful 
arrest, accompanied by a search and seizure incident to such 
arrest, does not violate constitutional guarantees under certain 
circumstances regardless of the fact that no warrant of arrest 
or search warrant Dlay have previously issued. (People v. 
Boyles, 45 Ca1.2d 652 [290 P.2d 535] j People v. Marlin, 
supra, 45 Ca1.2d 755.) As above indicated, however, this 
court has held that the reasonableness of the search incident 
to the arrest depends not only upon the lawfulness of the 
arrest, but also upon the reasonableness of the arrest. It is 
with this conclusion that I cannot agree, for if an arrest is 
lawful it does not appear appropriate to declare that such 
lawful arrest is unreasonable. 
As was said in State v. Williams, 328 Mo. 627 [14 S.W.2d 
434], at page 436 [14 S.W.2d], in affirming a judgment of 
conviction based upon evidence obtained through a search 
incident to an arrest without a warrant: "As applicable to 
this case it would not matter a particle, when the deputy 
sheriff made the arrest, whether reasonable ground to believe 
a felony had been committed was presented to his mind or not; 
he is justified because the reasonable ground existed; the 
Feb. 1956) BADILLO V. SUPERIOR COURT 
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crime had in fact been committed. That is a complete justi-
fication. The arrest was therefore lawful." 
If we are to formulate logical rules which will establish 
a consistent pattern, it appears to be illogical to hold reason-
able the searches made as incidents of lawful arrests in some 
of the decided eases, and at the same time to hold unreason-
able the search made as an incident of a lawful arrest in the 
present ease, as well as the searches made as incidents of 
lawful arrests in the Brown and Simon eases. The adoption 
of the rules laid down by the majority opinion here and in 
the cited eases means that a search made as an incident of 
an arrest declared lawful by subdivisions 3, 4 or 5 of section 
836, is reasonable, regardless of whether the person arrested 
has or has not committed a felony, provided that the arrest-
ing officer acts upon prior knowledge which may be sub-
sequently held to fall within the nebulous realm of "reason-
able cause," but that a search made as an incident of an 
arrest declared lawful by subdivision 2 of section 836 is 
unreasonable, regardless of the fact that the person arrested 
has actually committed a felony, unless the arresting officer 
acts upon prior knowledge which may be subsequently held 
to fall within that nebulous realm. In my opinion, rules 
which bring about this undesirable result are illogical, and 
they fail to establish any consistent pattern. The difficulty 
can be avoided if one logical, workable, and understandable 
rule is applied to all cases by holding that if the arrest is 
lawful, then the search made as an incident of the lawful 
arrest is a reasonable search, rather than an "unreasonable" 
search. 
While it is recognized that the guilty as well as the inno-
cent are entitled to the benefit of the constitutional guarantee 
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" (People v. 
CaJtan, supra; People v. Berger, supra; People v. Taran-
tino, supra), the cited cases did not present any question 
of the reasonableness of a search made as an incident of a law-
ful arrest. The claimed "unreasonable searches" or other in-
vasions of the defendants' rights in those eases were made 
over a long period of time and without any direct connection 
with any arrest. Here the search was made as an incident 
of a lawful arrest, in the sense that it was made at the time 
and place of such lawful arrest; and in my opinion, it should 
be held to be reasonable under these circumstances. 
By way of summary, I am of the opinion that the arrest 
in the present case was a lawful arrest under subdivision 
) 
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2 of section 8S6 of the Penal. Code, as it appears that the 
petitioner Badillo had committed and was committing a 
felony at the time of his arrest; that the search was an in-
cident of his lawful arrest and was therefore reasonable, and 
not in violation of the constitutional guarantee against "un-
reasonable searches and seizures"; that the evidence obtained 
by such search was therefore properly admitted upon the 
preliminary hearing; and that petitioner's motion to set aside 
the information upon the ground that the evidence was ob-
tained by an alleged "unreasonable" search and seizure was 
properly denied by the trial court. 
I would therefore discharge the alternative writ of pro-
hibition and deny the peremptOry writ. 
Shenk, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was c1f'nied Marc1:J 21. 
1956. Shenk, J., and Spence, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
